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I. INTRODUCTION
Restitution is one of many subjects in the criminal law that has
been favored with considerable attention but little rational thought.
This may be the result of its connection with the emotionally-charged
debate between those who believe offenders should be punished and
those who believe they should be cured. The former view, eloquently
stated in 1895, expresses the position of the victims' rights advocates:
The guilty man lodged, fed, clothed, warmed, lighted, entertained,
at the expense of the State in a model cell, issued from it with a sum
of money lawfully earned, has paid his debt to society; he can set his
victims at defiance; but the victim has his consolation; he can think
that by taxes he pays to the Treasury, he has contributed towards
the paternal care, which has guarded the criminal during his stay in
prison.1
The alternative view, however, has found equally articulate adherents:
[The criminal] is, at the expiration of his sentence, flung out of the
prison into the streets to earn his living in a labor market where
nobody will employ an ex-prisoner .... He seeks the only company
in which he is welcome: the society of criminals; and sooner or
later, according to his luck, he finds himself in prison again ....
The criminal, far from being deterred from crime, is forced into it;
and the citizen whom his punishment was meant to protect suffers
from his depredations. 2
Many have strong opinions on the subject of restitution, but few
seem to have a clear notion of what it is, how it works or to whom it
applies. For that reason, and because of the potentially dramatic ef-
fects of restitution upon the lives of both criminal defendants and vic-
tims of crime, it is important to assess the present state of the law of
restitution and, even more important, to identify critical areas that are
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yet to be settled. This article is an attempt to accomplish those two
ends.
I[. THE PRESENT STATE OF ALASKA'S LAW
The legislative history that underlies Alaska's statutory provi-
sions relating to restitution presents a curious problem. In the course
of its ambitious revision of Alaska's criminal code, the Criminal Law
Revision Subcommission devoted a significant amount of attention to
the subject of restitution. Its detailed draft statutes are accompanied
by extensive commentary, addressing many of the problems that have
arisen in other jurisdictions.3 The final version, in contrast, is cur-
sory.4 Whereas the drafts had provided guidance as to the mechanics
of how and how much restitution was to be paid, the statute as enacted
was virtually silent on those subjects. The legislative intent underlying
the modification of the detailed proposal into the vague final product is
unclear. There is a curious absence of any legislative history that
might shed light on the problem. The magnitude of the change can
only be appreciated after comparison of the two provisions.
The proposed statutory scheme consisted of three separate provi-
sions. The first provided for restitution either during imprisonment or
as a condition of probation or suspended imposition of sentence. It
required, in addition, that "the financial resources of the defendant
and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose" be taken
into account by the court imposing sentence.5 The accompanying
commentary made clear that restitution was to be "available in all
cases, not just those in which probation was granted."'6 The commen-
tary contemplated payment being taken from prison industry earnings,
but cautioned that "undue financial burdens" should not be imposed
on defendants or their dependents. 7 It set forth the following rationale
for the proposed scheme:
[B]ecause restitution is the one sanction which has the potential for
making a victim "whole," or nearly so, and because the victim is the
most frequently ignored party in the justice system, the Subcommis-
sion felt that restitution should be given more extended treatment as
a complementary sanction in the Revised Code.8
3. See CRIMINAL CODE REVISION SUBCOMM'N, ALASKA CRIM. CODE REVI-
SION TENTATIVE DRAFt, Part 6 at 52-56 (1978) [hereinafter ALASKA CRIM. CODE
REVISION].
4. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.045 (1990); S. JOuRNAL Supp. No. 47, at 151
(June 12, 1978).
5. ALASKA CRIM. CODE REVISION, supra note 3, at 52.
6. Id. at 54 (emphasis in original).
7. Id
8. Id
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The second provision authorized restitution "for the harm caused
by the offense."9 Reimbursable damages included replacement value
of lost or damaged property less salvage value, medical expenses "less
any reimbursement from another source, collateral or otherwise" and
lost wages less reimbursement. l0 This section also required notice to
the victim prior to imposition of a restitution order and limited the
effective duration of such an order to five years." Again, the text was
accompanied by clear commentary indicating that "victims should not
'profit' from their misfortunes" and that restitution should "simply
make the victim financially 'whole,' not better off, whenever possi-
ble."' 12 The five-year limit was based on the Subcommission's view
that a restitution obligation should not be "interminable." 13
Finally, the third provision authorized the court to modify or ter-
minate a restitution obligation if the defendant's conduct or circum-
stances warranted it.14 The proposed commentary was once again
quite explicit:
The Subcommission was not anxious to create sanctions which
could become counterproductive to the purposes of sentencing and
recognized that where obligations, especially those of a financial na-
ture, are imposed upon a defendant care must be taken to insure
that those obligations do not contribute to further anti-social ac-
tions by the defendant.' 5
These proposals hardly sound earth-shaking. They do, however,
take clear positions on most of the fundamental issues surrounding
restitution, and they constitute a solid policy platform from which to
infer legislative intent as to issues that are not directly addressed.
Most notably, the proposals provided answers to many of the ques-
tions that have already arisen in the appellate courts and others that
will necessarily arise as the law in this area continues to evolve.
This groundwork inexplicably disappeared in the process of en-
actment. In final form, the Subcommission's work was reduced to a
single statute:
Sec. 12.55.045. Restitution. (a) The court may order a defend-
ant convicted of an offense to make restitution as provided in this
section or as otherwise authorized by law. In determining the
amount and method of payment of restitution, the court shall take
into account the financial resources of the defendant and the nature
of the burden its payment will impose.
9. Id at 52.
10. Id. at 52-53.
11. Id. at 53.
12. Id. at 55.
13. Id. at 56.
14. Id. at 53.
15. Id at 56.
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(b) An order of restitution under this section does not limit any
civil liability of the defendant arising from the defendant's conduct.
(c) If a defendant is sentenced to pay restitution, the court may
grant permission for the payment to be made within a specified pe-
riod of time or in specified installments. 16
The official commentary provides, in full, as follows:
The Code authorizes the court to require the defendant to pay
restitution to his victim for all offenses and in addition to other au-
thorized or required sentences. For a discussion of various types of
restitution programs, see Harlan and Warren, "National Evaluation
of Adult Restitution Programs"; "Research Report No. 1," Crimi-
nal Justice Center, Albany, N.Y. 1977; Hudson and Galaway, Resti-
tution in Criminal Justice. A Critical Assessment of Sanctions,
Lexington Books, Cambridge, MA. (1977); "Research in Restitu-
tion: A Review and Assessment," Presented to the Second National
Restitution Symposium, St. Paul, Minn (11/15/77); and Shafer,
Stephen, Restitution to Victims of Crime, Quadrangel [sic] Books,
Chicago, Ill. (1960).
Subsection (a) requires the court to consider the defendant's
financial resources in setting restitution.
Subsection (b) requires the victim be notified before restitution
is ordered; this implies that a victim may refuse restitution. For
example, if the victim does not wish to be reminded of the crime by
receiving monthly payments from the defendant, the court should
accommodate the victim's wishes. This section also provides that
payment of restitution does not affect the civil liability of the de-
fendant for his conduct.
Subsection (c) allows the court to order the defendant to make
restitution in periodic payments or within a specified period of
time. 17
The courts have yet to address the question of what this means.
A solution is suggested, however, by the Alaska Court of Appeals'
analysis of a similar problem in State v. Rastopsoff.18 That case re-
quired interpretation of the phrase "previously convicted" as used in
the presumptive sentencing statutes.' 9 Neither the statutes themselves
nor the official commentary provided sufficient guidance to allow the
court to choose between the competing interpretations that were prof-
fered.20 But the commentary of the Criminal Code Revision Subcom-
mission was clear.21 The presumptive sentencing commentary, like
the commentary on restitution, disappeared during the legislative pro-
cess without explanation; and the statutes themselves were similarly
16. ALAsicA STAT. § 12.55.045 (1984). This section has been subsequently
amended. See ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.045 (1990).
17. S. JouRNAL Supp. No. 47, at 151-52 (June 12, 1978).
18. 659 P.2d 630 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
19. Id. at 634.
20. Id at 636-38.
21. Id at 639.
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altered, retaining their draft form only in certain narrow areas.22 The
court deemed it appropriate to rely heavily upon the Subcommission's
commentary as an interpretive aid.23 In addition to the "well-settled"
principle "that the report of a commission on a revision of statutory
law provides evidence of legislative intent,"24 the court relied on three
"forceful indicators" that the legislature intended to adopt the Sub-
commission's interpretation: the clarity of the Subcommission's com-
mentary, the similarity between certain portions of the draft and the
final versions, and, significantly, "the lack of any discussion - in
either house of the legislature - to indicate rejection of the Subcom-
mission's interpretation. '25
The first and third of these indicators apply with equal force to
the restitution context. The second is more problematic in that most
of what emerged in the enacted version of the restitution statute ap-
pears essentially verbatim in the draft. While the final version omits
language, it never actually contradicts the draft. The second criterion
also seems to apply in essentially the same way as it did to the issue
presented in Rastopsoff. It thus seems fairly clear that the Subcommis-
sion's commentary should provide critical help in resolving ambigui-
ties that appear in the statutory law. The commentary has not,
however, received any significant attention to date.
Appellate litigation in the area of restitution has addressed only a
few of the issues considered by the Subcommission. In Brezenoff v.
State,26 the Alaska Court of Appeals held that the trial court, at the
time of sentencing, is obligated to identify the persons who are entitled
to restitution and determine the extent of their losses, and that the trial
court cannot delegate this obligation to the probation officer.27 Rea-
soning that it is the defendant's "ability to pay restitution after she is
released which is material to the inquiry contemplated by [Alaska
Statutes section] 12.55.045(a)," the court also ruled that it was appro-
priate to defer consideration of that question until after completion of
any period of incarceration imposed.28 These principles were reiter-
ated twice29 before the Alaska Supreme Court accepted a petition for
review in Karr v. State.30
22. Id. at 639 n.9.
23. Id. at 639 (citing 2A C. SANDS, SUTHERLAND ON STATUTORY CONSTRUC-
flON § 48.09 (4th ed. 1973)).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 658 P.2d 1359 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
27. Id. at 1363-64.
28. Id. at 1364.
29. Short v. State, 676 P.2d 612, 614 (Alaska Ct. App. 1984); Karr v. State, 660
P.2d 450, 452-53 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983), rev'd, 686 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1984).
30. 686 P.2d 1192 (Alaska 1984).
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When the court finally spoke, it spoke decisively:
There are policy considerations that militate against the ap-
proach adopted by the Court of Appeals in Brezenoff. Restitution
should not only compensate the victim for the harm inflicted by the
offender, but should further the rehabilitation of the offender. If
restitution is ordered in an amount that is clearly impossible for the
offender to pay, the offender's rehabilitation will be inhibited and
not furthered. If the offender is haled into court for nonpayment of
restitution under [section] 12.55.051(a), or if the offender petitions
the court under [Alaska Statutes section] 12.55.051(c) to avoid this
sanction, his reintegration into society will be disrupted. Also, an
offender might simply give up and make no payments at all if the
restitution ordered is clearly impossible to pay. This could result in
the offender's incarceration under [section] 12.55.051(a), or in his
fleeing the jurisdiction to avoid this sanction, neither of which
would further the dual goals behind restitution. 31
Relying on that rationale, in addition to language appearing in the
-statute and accompanying commentary, the supreme court overruled
Brezenoff, imposing the requirement that a defendant's ability to pay
be determined at the time of sentencing.32 The court of appeals has
restated this requirement, without comment, in several subsequent
opinions.33
Only four appellate cases address issues unrelated to the Karri
Brezenoff line of authority. Kimbrell v. State establishes the narrow
rule that a defendant can be compelled to pay restitution on a dis-
missed charge if the'court specifically finds that:
(1) the amount of loss suffered by an identifiable aggrieved party is
certain; (2) the defendant admits, and there is no factual question as
31. Id at 1197.
32. Id at 1196-97.
33. Monroe v. State, 752 P.2d 1017, 1022 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988) (Failure to
consider defendant's earning capacity at the time a fine or restitution is imposed "re-
quires automatic reversal."); Ashton v. State, 737 P.2d 1365, 1366 (Alaska Ct. App.
1987) ("The trial court is under a mandatory duty to consider a defendant's earning
capacity in connection with any imposition of a fine or restitution."); Toovak v. State,
736 P.2d 355, 355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987) ("To comply with [Alaska Statutes section
12.55.045(a)], the sentencing court must first determine what the accused's future
earning capacity is likely to be; it must then fix the amount and terms of restitution to
fall within the realistic limits of that capacity."); Kramer v. State, 735 P.2d 754, 756
(Alaska Ct. App. 1987) ("In this case, the trial court has never made express findings
of fact regarding Kramer's ability to pay restitution once he obtains his freedom. The
case must therefore be remanded for that purpose."); Ahkivgak v. State, 730 P.2d 168,
171 (Alaska Ct. App. 1986) ("[Alaska Statutes section] 12.55.045(a) authorizes the
trial court to order restitution, but requires that the court consider defendant's finan-
cial resources and the burden restitution will impose before setting the amount.");
Zimmerman v. State, 706 P.2d 343, 344 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) ("The trial court
could not make a valid restitution order without determining Zimmerman's future
earning capacity.").
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to whether, the defendant caused or was responsible for the ag-
grieved party's loss; and (3) the defendant consents, freely and vol-
untarily, to make full restitution.. .. 34
In restating the Karr rule, Lawrence v. State held that in awarding
restitution for "anticipated future expenses," the court must at least
require that these expenses be "firmly established.1 35 Notably, Law-
rence did not address the more serious issue raised by the appellant:
whether restitution can be awarded to persons other than the victim
who may have suffered harm from defendant's conduct.3 6 Kramer v.
State contains the following cryptic dicta:
It is important to stress that restitution and civil damages are totally
independent under Alaska law. [Alaska Statutes section]
12.55.045(b) provides that an order of restitution under this section
does not limit any civil liability of the defendant arising from the
defendant's conduct. Thus a restitutionary award has no effect on
the victim's ability to recover damages in a civil action.37
Finally, Dorris v. State holds without elaboration that "the collateral
source rule prevents [a defendant] from benefiting from his victim's
insurance. '38
Of these four cases, Dorris is the most interesting and potentially
the most important. Although the rule it states is a narrow one, and
not particularly significant in itself, its implication is far-reaching: the
Dorris rule is in direct conflict with the tentative draft and accompany-
ing commentary, both of which explicitly excluded "reimbursement
from another source, collateral or otherwise" from the set damages
recoverable in the restitution context. 39 This suggests that, Rastopsoff
notwithstanding, the court of appeals will not look to the Subcommis-
sion's draft or commentary for guidance when interpreting the restitu-
tion statutes. If Kramer does authorize a double recovery for
restitution recipients who subsequently sue in civil court, it carries the
same implication.4° These cases would appear to constitute strong au-
thority against applying the Rastopsoff principles of statutory interpre-
tation in the restitution context.
34. 666 P.2d 454, 455 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983) (quoting United States v. Mc-
Laughlin, 512 F. Supp. 907, 908 (D. Md. 1981)).
35. 764 P.2d 318, 322 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988).
36. See id.
37. 735 P.2d 754, 756 n.2 (Alaska Ct. App. 1987).
38. 656 P.2d 578, 583 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
39. ALASKA CRIM. CODE REVISIoN, supra note 3, at 52-53.
40. Compare id. at 55 ("ITihe Subcommission... concluded that victims should
not 'profit' from their misfortunes .... The intent was to simply make the victim
financially 'whole,' not better off, whenever possible.") with Kramer, 735 P.2d at 756
n.2 ("[A]n order of restitution ... does not limit any civil liability of the defendant
arising from the defendant's conduct. Thus a restitutionary award has no effect on the
victim's ability to recover damages in a civil action.").
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Consideration of this whole body of legislative history, statutory
law, and case law together reveals several rather obvious facts about
the law of criminal restitution in Alaska. First, and most obvious, it is
at best in an extreme state of flux. Practitioners cannot guess what
role the tentative draft and commentary might play in interpreting
present statutory provisions. Specifically, with regard to the collateral
source rule and the question of double liability, they cannot be sure
whether the legislative history, interpreted under Rastopsoff, or con-
trary statements in Dorris and Kramer will ultimately hold sway.
Generally, it is not at all clear whether the tentative draft and com-
mentary have been rejected sub silentio by Dorris and Kramer or, if
not, what the status of those materials will be with regard to litigation
of other issues that have yet to be considered at the appellate level.
What is known about restitution in Alaska can be summed up
succinctly. It is intended to serve the dual purposes of compensating
the victim and rehabilitating the offender.41 A trial court can order
restitution only after a careful inquiry into the defendant's ability to
pay.42 A restitution award based on anticipated future expenses can
be entered only if such expenses are "firmly established. '43 Finally, a
court can require a defendant to pay restitution on dismissed counts
only with his consent.44 What we do not know is the subject of the
next section of this article.
Before proceeding to that subject, however, it is important to
make one crucial point relating to the reason for the dearth of appel-
late law in this area. Defendants, with good reason, typically perceive
that a willingness to undertake a large restitution obligation will result
in a shorter stay in custody. It is obvious to all that the best way to
demonstrate "rehabilitative potential," and therefore minimize jail
time, is to accept responsibility and show remorse for one's crime -
and that the easiest and most convincing way to do so is to assume the
obligation to compensate victims fully for the losses they have suf-
fered. Conversely, it is equally obvious that squabbling about restitu-
tion at the time of sentencing demonstrates a lack of rehabilitative
potential and promises to result in a longer stay in jail. As a result, it
is extremely rare for a defendant to raise any question at all as to the
victim's request for restitution, especially in view of two facts. First,
41. Karr, 686 P.2d at 1197.
42. Id.
43. Lawrence, 764 P.2d at 322.
44. Kimbrell, 666 P.2d at 455.
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he cannot be sanctioned for subsequent nonpayment unless it is "at-
tributable to an intentional refusal or failure to make a good faith ef-
fort to pay."' 45 Second, Rule 35(b) of the Alaska Rules of Criminal
Procedure authorizes the court to modify the original award "at any
time" upon a showing of "changed circumstances." 46 The context of
criminal sentencing is, in other words, so inherently coercive that it is
extremely rare for a defendant to do anything but acquiesce in the
state's demands with regard to restitution.4 7 This is another subject
that will be addressed at greater length below. For present purposes, it
is sufficient to point out that there is a very good reason for the appel-
late courts' relative silence on restitution issues: defendants rarely
raise them at the trial court level and appeal them even more rarely.
Given the infrequency with which these issues are even presented for
review, it is hardly the fault of the court that we have only the most
vestigial sort of law in this area. But that fact provides little solace to
defendants and defense counsel who would like to make sense of these
issues.
III. UNSETTLED ISSUES
The unsettled areas of Alaska restitution law fall neatly into two
categories: those that are the subject of conflicting statements by the
courts and the legislature and those that have yet to be addressed by
either. The issues in the first category are implicit in the survey of
Alaska law presented above. Because courts have begun to address
these problems, it is likely that they will be solved soon and fairly
straightforwardly. This is not the case with the much larger category
of problems that have yet to receive any attention at all.
A. Conflicts in Existing Law
The difficulties presented by conflicts in existing law relate
largely, but not entirely, to the ambiguous role the tentative draft and
commentary will play in the development of law in this area. The
problems raised in Kramer and Dorris are the most obvious of these
and thus will be the easiest to resolve.
As suggested, the Alaska Court of Appeals could simply state
that it has sub silentio rejected all legislative history that conflicts with
the Kramer dicta and the Dorris collateral source holding. Clearly,
45. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.051(a) (1990). See Lominac v. Municipality of
Anchorage, 658 P.2d 792, 793-94 (Alaska Ct. App. 1983).
46. ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. § 35(b).
47. A particularly striking example of this phenomenon appears in State v. Har-
ris, 362 A.2d 32, 37 (N.J. 1976): "Believing herself facing the specter of jail, the de-
fendant threw herself on the mercy of the court: .... 'If I've committed a crime, I'll
pay every dime back.... Please don't take me away from my babies."'
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however, this easy solution would create more problems than it would
solve. The multiple recovery suggested in Kramer not only runs
counter to legislative history, but violates the fundamental premises of
restitution identified in Karr. It is difficult to see how compelling a
defendant to pay restitution in an amount exceeding actual loss could
"rehabilitate" the offender. The same flaw is evident to a lesser extent
in Dorris. Once the victim has recovered his loss through insurance, it
is not at all clear that payment to an insurance company - which is in
the business of contracting to cover such losses - will have the antici-
pated rehabilitative effect. There are, in other words, sound policy
reasons for adopting the rule that insurance companies are not "ag-
grieved parties" within the meaning of Fee v. State,48 and are thus not
entitled to restitution.
While one can finesse the Kramer problem by interpreting section
12.55.045(b) to mean only that a restitution award does not preclude a
civil suit for the difference between the actual loss and the amount
recovered a- restitution, the issue raised by Dorris will not be so sim-
ple. It seems clear that the court must either retrench on the collateral
source rule or reject the legislative history outright - with concomi-
tant violence to the policy rationales set out in Karr.
Other inconsistencies in the law are somewhat subtler. The dis-
tinction between restitution as an element of a sentence49 or as a con-
dition of probation 50 is a mystery. If, as in the federal system,5' the
former provision is simply intended to create a residual category for
cases in which the court does not order probation, it is sensible but of
very limited utility: it would apply only to defendants supervised by
the parole board during their period of "mandatory good time re-
lease,"' 52 and would have the same practical effect as a condition of
probation. If, on the other hand, this provision is meant to create an
alternative :procedure for enforcing restitution orders, its meaning is
completely unclear. It would accomplish nothing more than replace-
ment of probation revocation sanctions with much weaker contempt
sanctions, 53 and would place responsibility for enforcement with a
judge rather than a probation officer employed for that purpose.
There is not, and cannot be, any reason to believe that an order en-
tered pursuant to Alaska Statutes section 12.55.045(a) is somehow
more enforceable than one entered in accordance with section
48. 656 P.2d 1201, 1206 (Alaska Ct. App. 1982).
49. See ALASKA STAT. § 12.55.045(a) (1990).
50. See icl § 12.55.100(a)(2).
51. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3663(f), (g) (1985 & West Supp. 1990).
52. See ALASKA STAT. § 33.16.010(c) (1986 & Supp. 1990).
53. Compare id. § 09.050.010 (1984) with id. § 09.050.020.
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12.55. 100(a)(2).54 Nor is there any reason to believe that either provi-
sion authorizes creation of an obligation that survives the termination
of parole or probation.55
Examination of the implications of ordering imprisonment in lieu
of restitution pursuant to section 12.55.051(a)5 6 reveals further diffi-
culties. Most obviously, whether the defendant's failure to pay is "in-
tentional" or not, putting him in prison will hardly serve to
compensate the victim. Nor is it likely to "rehabilitate the offender."
Anyone who is able to pay restitution but feels so strongly against it
that even the threat of jail fails to make an impression will only be
embittered by further imprisonment. It seems clear that neither of the
Karr interests 57 can be served by this provision. Furthermore, what
happens if the victim chooses to enforce the restitution order by execu-
tion while the defendant is in prison for his willful failure to pay? It
appears that a defendant can be simultaneously forced to pay and im-
prisoned for his refusal to do so voluntarily. In fact, since imprison-
ment must be premised on ability to pay, it appears that this double
54. Alaska Statutes section 12.55.100(a)(2) provides:
(a) While on probation and among the conditions of probation, the defend-
ant may be required
(2) to make restitution or reparation to aggrieved parties for actual
damages or loss caused by the crime for which conviction was had ....
Id § 12.55.100(a)(2) (1990).
55. Trial court judges have occasionally attempted to convert restitution orders to
civil judgments at the time probation expires. At least one federal case suggests that
this procedure would violate constitutional guarantees of the right to trial by jury. See
infra note 69 and accompanying text.
56. Alaska Statutes section 12.55.051(a) provides:
If the defendant defaults in the payment of a fine or any installment or of
restitution or any installment, the court may order the defendant to show
cause why the defendant should not be sentenced to imprisonment for non-
payment. If the state presents evidence of the defendant's failure to pay res-
titution, the court may presume that the defendant has intentionally refused
to pay the fine or restitution or has not made a good faith effort to pay the
fine or restitution unless the defendant presents some evidence that the de-
fendant's failure to pay the fine or restitution was not intentional or that the
defendant has made a good faith effort to pay the fine or restitution. If the
court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the default was attributa-
ble to an intentional refusal or failure to make a good faith effort to pay the
fine or restitution, the court may order the defendant imprisoned until the
order of the court is satisfied. A term of imprisonment imposed under this
section may not exceed one day for each $50 of the unpaid portion of the fine
or restitution or one year, whichever is shorter. Credit shall be given toward
satisfaction of the order of the court for every day a person is incarcerated
for nonpayment of a fine or restitution.
ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.051(a) (1990).
57. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
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liability must always be the case. Otherwise, one or the other of these
provisions would necessarily be superfluous.
None of these inconsistencies has been the subject of appellate
litigation, yet they are painfully obvious when one examines the fairly
meager body of law from which they arise. The explanation for this
odd state of affairs appears to be twofold. First, defendants and de-
fense counsel are powerfully motivated to take the meekest possible
approach to restitution. The second reason is less obvious but more
important: the internal inconsistencies in the law of restitution reflect
the conceptual and constitutional problems inherent in the subject.
B. Extrinsic Problems
In many ways, the most fundamental question about restitution
in criminal law concerns its relationship to civil remedies. To the ex-
tent that it seeks to "compensate the victim," restitution mirrors the
civil system, seeking to approximate the result of full-scale civil litiga-
tion. Unhappily, the consequences of this simple and undeniable ob-
servation are even more problematic than the issues already discussed.
The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act contains the follow-
ing innocent-sounding provision:
The court may provide for payment to the victim up to but not in
excess of the pecuniary loss caused by the offense. The defendant is
entitled to assert any defense that he could raise in a civil action for
the loss sought to be compensated by the restitution order.5 8
Assuming that restitution should make victims "financially 'whole'"
without permitting them to "profit" from an award, this provision
must be implicit in Alaska law as well.
This principle necessarily imports the concept of proximate cause
from the law of torts, 59 which requires attention to two areas that have
been largely ignored in Alaska: the causal relationship between the
crime charged and the victim's loss, 6° and the causal relationship be-
tween the defendant's behavior and the victim's loss. 6 1 It must cer-
tainly provide for the same contributory fault setoff to which civil
58. MODEL SENTENCING AND CORRE nONs ACT § 3-601(d), 10 U.L.A. 104
(Special Pamphlet 1987).
59. Alaska Statutes section 12.55.100(a)(2) authorizes restitution for "actual dam-
ages... caused by the crime for which conviction was had .... ." ALAsKA STAT.
§ 12.55.100(a)(2) (1990).
60. Restitution for damages on the basis of a "leaving the scene" conviction
would be inappropriate for the reason that the damages resulting from the accident
would not be causally related to "the crime for which conviction was had." See id.
§ 12.55.100(a)(2) (1990). Damages resulting from defendant's failure to render assist-
ance, on the other hand, could be awarded.
61. This issue was raised in a recent Fairbanks case. Defendant was convicted of
driving while intoxicated after colliding with a street light. When the owner of the
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defendants are entitled.62 It would seem equally certain that criminal
defendants are entitled to the benefits of the "tort reform" package
enacted as a result of Alaska's 1988 election,63 including the end of
routine joint and several liability orders in cases involving codefend-
ants. But what about counterclaims" or permissive counterclaims? 65
To the extent that the existing restitution statutes deprive criminal de-
fendants of these benefits and treat them differently from their civil
counterparts, "victims" gain financial advantages over civil plaintiffs
- and " 'profit' from their misfortunes."' 66 At the same time, though,
criminal defendants can obtain these benefits only by converting the
otherwise summary restitution hearing into something approximating
a full-scale civil trial.
This comparison between civil and criminal defendants, implicit
in the concept of restitution, can and must be taken much further.
First, it suggests a fairly obvious equal protection issue.67 To the ex-
tent that criminal defendants are deprived of the benefits discussed
above, they are systematically treated differently from their civil coun-
terparts. Even if those problems are eliminated, several others remain.
Unlike defendants in civil actions, criminal defendants have no right
to a jury trial on liability and damage issues. They lack the benefit of
the rules of evidence and, above and beyond the inherently coercive
nature of their situation, they face opponents who enjoy legal assist-
ance provided at state expense and who do not even have to appear in
court to recover a large award. It is very difficult to see how the state's
interest in compensating victims and rehabilitating offenders can out-
weigh the criminal defendant's interest in equitable treatment. This
question has yet to be raised before either of Alaska's appellate courts.
vehicle - who had loaned it to defendant - sought restitution, defendant success-
fully claimed that it was the owner's negligent maintenance of the brakes, not the
defendant's intoxication, that caused the accident.
62. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.060 (1990).
63. See id. § 09.17.080.
64. Suppose, for example, that the owner of the vehicle described in note 61,
supra, had recovered restitution. Could defendant seek a setoff in the amount of his
own medical bills on the basis of the owner's negligence? See generally ALASKA R.
CIv. P. 13.
65. A defendant in a recent forgery case claimed that the victim had wrongfully
withheld past wages in an amount nearly equal to his own wrongful gain. Although
the judge rejected this argument, the issue will not be resolved on appeal for the usual
reason: defendant's inability to pay mooted that other related questions.
66. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
67. See State v. Erickson, 574 P.2d 1, 12 (Alaska 1978) (discussing Alaska's equal
protection standard).
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A subsidiary constitutional issue is equally troubling: Alaska's
constitution guarantees the right to a jury trial in civil actions involv-
ing more than $250.68 Why is a criminal defendant ineligible to assert
this right in response to a restitution claim? Courts responding to the
parallel federal argument have provided interesting answers. In
United States v. Brown,69 for example, the Second Circuit held that
"[s]o long as. [restitution] is a permissible form of punishment, it is not
subject to civil requirements simply because it also achieves some of
the purposes of a civil judgment." In Alaska, however, restitution is
not a "form of punishment" - it is rehabilitative. The Second Cir-
cuit's rationale does not satisfy the state constitutional requirements.
In United States v. Florence,70 the Eighth Circuit responded to the
same argument with the simple pronouncement that a restitution or-
der is not a civil judgment and therefore does not implicate the seventh
amendment. In Alaska, at least, it is not at all clear that civil judg-
ments and restitution orders differ in any meaningful way, 71 and this
rationale is apparently precluded. Federal law rejecting the seventh
amendment claim would appear to present no obstacle to the parallel
state claim, which has yet to be asserted before either Alaska appellate
court.
Finally, and most obviously, a restitution order involves a depri-
vation of property - which must be preceded by "the opportunity to
be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner."' 72 Given
the universal assumptions that acceptance of responsibility for one's
crime and willingness to compensate one's victim reflect well on reha-
bilitative potential (and result in less jail time) it is arguable that sen-
tencing can never be a "meaningful time" to determine a defendant's
liability to an injured party. Defendants, if properly prepared, appear
at these hearings powerfully motivated to be as sorry as possible and to
acquiesce in any demand the victim might make. At the least, it
would appear that due process must require that a defendant have the
right to be heard in a manner that preserves the rights that could be
asserted by a civil litigant and insures that his liability does not exceed
the amount recoverable in parallel civil litigation. Again, no Alaska
appellant has urged any argument related to these issues.
68. ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 16.
69. 744 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1984). See also United States v. Satterfield, 743
F.2d 827, 836-37 (11th Cir. 1984).
70. 741 F.2d 1066, 1067 (8th Cir. 1984).
71. Given that Alaska Statutes section 12.55.051(d) provides that a "restitution
recipient may enforce payment of a restitution order ... as if the order were a civil
judgment," the only practical difference would appear to be the period of time during
which execution is available. ALAsKA STAT. § 12.55.051(d) (1990); see id. § 09.35.020
(1983).
72. Armstrong'v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 (1965).
[Vol. 7:333
RESTITUTION
It is not difficult to understand why these apparently important
issues receive so little attention. The real issue for most criminal de-
fendants, best intentions notwithstanding, is ability to pay. This fact
typically moots any legal issue the case might otherwise have
presented. For those few defendants who have the resources to pay
significant restitution, actual civil litigation would generally tend to
moot those same issues and consume such legal resources as are avail-
able to the exclusion of the restitution issues. It is not surprising that
there has been so little appellate litigation in this area. It is, in fact,
unlikely that these questions will ever be resolved through appellate
argument.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS
If these problems are inherent in the nature of criminal restitu-
tion, it is tempting to recommend its abolition. Nevertheless, this so-
lution should be resisted for two reasons. First, restitution does in fact
serve a meaningful purpose: it compensates victims who, for whatever
reason, do not seek compensation through civil litigation. At the same
time, restitution may have a rehabilitative effect on an offender, by
forcing him to consciously address the consequences of his actions.
Although these considerations are not unimportant, the second reason
for retaining restitution is far more significant: restitution has such
strong public support that its elimination is not practically or politi-
cally feasible. Restitution will be part of criminal justice whether the
legal community likes it or not, so we would be well advised to make
the best of the situation. In order to do so, we must articulate, as
clearly as possible, just what restitution seeks to accomplish. Alaska
has yet to do so, and that failure is largely to blame for the chaotic
state of the law at present.
One strand of legal doctrine suggests that the purposes of restitu-
tion are to compensate victims and rehabilitate offenders. If those are
really to be the goals, we need to strive for a more reliable and less
coercive way to determine fault and liability. The ability to rehabili-
tate offenders through restitution depends on an impression of fair and
rational treatment. This impression probably cannot be achieved
while restitution remains part of the sentencing process - at least as
long as defendants are in a position to reduce jail terms by maximizing
restitution obligations. As for the goal of compensating victims, the
civil system has spent centuries refining that concept. There is no rea-
son to view the compensation function as anything other than a desire
to approximate civil damages within the streamlined format of sen-
tencing. Most of the problems raised by restitution could be elimi-
nated by simply bifurcating the sentencing process. During the first
phase, all sentencing issues other than restitution could be resolved,
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and all terms and conditions but those relating to restitution could be
imposed. The prosecution could then request a second phase, relating
only to restitution. This procedure would eliminate the coercion in-
herent in the present system. It would allow the defendant, assuming
he contests any restitution issues, to require proof of fault, causation
and damages. by a preponderance of the evidence as in civil litigation.
In addition, it would enable the victim who is unable to pursue civil
remedies to seek compensation with only a minimal investment of time
and no investment of money. The second phase would, of course, be
unnecessary if the prosecution declines to seek restitution, if the de-
fendant concedes liability, or if the victim initiates a civil action.
A separate strand of doctrine suggests, less openly but quite
forcefully, that the true goals of restitution lie elsewhere. If one thinks
of restitution in terms of societal condemnation and deterrence, rather
than compensation and rehabilitation, one reaches quite different con-
clusions. Under this view, restitution becomes essentially a fine paya-
ble to the victim and has the punitive effect of a fine on the offender.73
Viewed in this light, restitution would be procedurally simple: it
would require attention only to those issues considered when fines are
imposed and would quite literally be "totally independent" 74 from
civil damages. There does not appear to be any obstacle - concep-
tual, constitutional or otherwise - to this view of restitution.
The problem with the law in this area lies not so much with one
or the other of these alternative views as with their uneasy coexistence.
Most, if not all, of the inconsistencies are attributable to the fact that
neither the legislature nor the courts have made it clear which view
they are endorsing. A firm statement of the purpose of restitution
would go a long way towards resolving those inconsistencies and solv-
ing the many practical problems the trial courts confront on a daily
basis.75
Finally, practitioners must recognize that it is unlikely that this
firm statement will be forthcoming, and that they must carry on as
well as present circumstances allow. For the defense bar, this means
continuing to prepare clients to be as remorseful, and as willing to pay
whatever the victim demands, as possible, until the sentence is im-
posed. In a case that raises true restitution issues, however, that is
only the beginning; such issues can virtually always be raised either in
73. Cf Thibedeau v. State, 617 P.2d 759 (Alaska 1980) (holding that the imposi-
tion of a fine payable to the state did not increase defendant's sentence in violation of
the double jeopardy provision of the constitution).
74. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
75. Although Karr contains just such a statement of purpose, see supra note 37
and accompanying text, subsequent legislative and appellate court pronouncements
cast doubt on its continuing vitality.
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a motion to modify sentence76 or a motion to correct an illegal sen-
tence,77 thereby accomplishing much of what the bifurcated sentenc-
ing format has to offer. Prosecuting attorneys will best serve victims'
interests by urging the second of the alternatives discussed above. To
the extent that prosecutors can persuade judges to rely on the "restitu-
tion as fine" paradigm, they will succeed in heading off defense argu-
ments analogizing restitution to civil litigation. The best advice to
litigants is, in short, to argue at cross purposes. Both sides are fully
justified in proceeding from antithetical premises, and both can find
adequate support in the law for doing so.
Not surprisingly, the best advice for practitioners working within
the system is not at all like the recommendations one would make to
those who are responsible for molding that system. Members of the
first group need to be aware of the inconsistencies so as to be able to
exploit them. As long as the law can be read to justify either of the
competing views, there is little to be gained by revealing its flaws (and
therefore the other side's strongest arguments). Legislators and appel-
late judges are in a different position. If the law of restitution is to
function in a coherent manner, it is essential that they clarify what
restitution is intended to accomplish and formulate at least general
procedures to be applied in working toward that end. Such a state-
ment of purpose will have fairly dramatic consequences, in that it will
result in the excision of one half of existing law or the other, but it is a
necessary precondition to achieving a rational and equitable resolution
of the many problems this body of law now presents.
V. CONCLUSION
Alaska's law of criminal restitution comprises two dramatically
opposed perceptions of what restitution is and should be. These op-
posing strands of legal doctrine are manifested in numerous unresolv-
able conflicts among the cases, the statutes, and the legislative history.
As things now stand, trial courts have little in the way of a coherent
body of law from which to work and consequently resolve restitution
issues in inconsistent and idiosyncratic ways.
The first step towards a solution of this problem must be the for-
mulation of a clear and definitive statement of what restitution is and
what it should accomplish. If that statement takes the form of an
analogy to civil damages, it will be a fairly simple matter to generate
procedural rules to compensate victims and rehabilitate offenders. If,
on the other hand, fines are to be the paradigm, implementation will
76. ALAsKA R. CRIM. P. 35(b).
77. ALAsKA R. Cium. P. 35(a), 35.1(a)(1).
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be equally simple: the new rule need only state that the goals of resti-
tution are punitive and that victims will receive funds that would
otherwise be remitted to the state.
For poli.cy reasons, it is the author's contention that the former
view is preferable. As the original drafters of Alaska's criminal code
indicated, fairness would seem to preclude victims from profiting from
restitution and would seem to suggest that a rational system of com-
pensation for wrongs is likely to further an offender's rehabilitation.
There are, at the same time, factors that might support the alternative
view. Victims rarely receive full compensation and seldom file civil
actions. This fact, coupled with a preference for punishment rather
than rehabilitation of the offender, suggests that a streamlined proce-
dure that does not preclude recovery in excess of a victim's loss would
be appropriate. Neither view does violence to any settled constitu-
tional principle and either could easily constitute the conceptual un-
derpinning for a rational system of restitution for victims of crime.
But they cannot coexist. Alaska's present mixture of rules represent-
ing both views is unsatisfactory and badly needs attention.
